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Abstract
This paper studies the implications of asymmetric scal stabilization policy for the budget
de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its target level. We test our hypothesis empirically and 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11 Introduction
The development of budget decits and public debt has raised much concern among OECD
policymakers. From the beginning of the 1970s, public debt has increased sharply in many
OECD countries, reaching levels of more than 100 per cent of GDP for example in Belgium, Italy
and Ireland by 1995. Along with the increase in debt, the role of scal policy as an instrument for
improving macroeconomic performance has become the subject of renewed debate. On the one
hand, advocates of discretionary scal policy point out that counter-cyclical policies can smooth

uctuations in economic activity and promote output growth. On the other hand, opponents
highlight that discretionary scal policy can potentially exploit the public budget in ways which
are not optimal from a social welfare point of view and thus call for rules to maintain scal
sustainability.
Theoretically, the role of budget decits is controversial. According to the classic theory
of tax-smoothing, budget decits can be optimal in the presence of temporary and unexpected
spending shocks (Barro, 1979). However, according to political economy theory, decits can also
be non-optimal, as socio-economic groups with self-interest may adopt policies of overspending.
These policies may be individually rational but collectively inecient (Weingast et al., 1981;
Roubini and Sachs, 1989a,b; Tornell and Lane, 1999; Velasco, 2000; Alesina and Drazen, 1991).1
In this paper, we develop a simple theory of decits arising due to asymmetric scal policy
preferences. In our model, a benevolent government seeks to minimize deviations of aggregate
output and of the decit from some target values. However, negative deviations of output are
weighted more heavily in the loss function than positive deviations. In other words, recessions
receive a higher weight than booms. This asymmetry in the loss function induces the government
to run a relatively large decit on average in order to avoid economic downturns. Put dierently,
the government pursues an output stabilization policy in a way that minimizes the probability
of a recession. That is, the asymmetry in the loss function is consistent with a precautionary
motive for stabilization policy. As a result, the decit exceeds the target value on average. We
label this upward bias in the decit the precautionary bias.
From the model, we derive a reaction function for the scal authority that describes the
choice of the decit as a function of the output gap and the volatility of the output gap. In
1The theory of tax-smoothing calls for budget surpluses in times of low spending as a compensation for the
budget decits in times of high spending to keep the inter-temporal public budget balanced.
2our empirical analysis we estimate the parameters of this reaction function empirically, which
allows us to determine the cyclicality of scal policy and to quantify the precautionary bias in
a sample of 20 OECD countries over the period 1987 - 2005.
Our results indicate that scal policy in the countries in our sample is conducted in a counter-
cyclical and asymmetric way, placing more weight on avoiding economic downturns than on
smoothing upturns. Based on our preferred specication we nd that the resulting upward bias
in the decit accounts for approximately 13 percent of the average decit as a fraction of GDP.
Since the literature argues that a decit bias can be due to certain characteristics of the
political system, it is possible that the precautionary bias identied in our analysis is also linked
to, for example, the number of parties in government. To explore this potential link, we relate
the precautionary bias to a number of variables frequently used in the empirical literature on
the political economy of scal policy. Even though we nd that the degree of federalism and
government fragmentation can in
uence the precautionary bias, the evidence is rather week.
We conclude that in contrast to this conventional decit bias, the precautionary bias is largely
independent of political economy issues.
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. A number of papers estimate the
degree to which scal policies in OECD countries follow a counter-cyclical pattern and analyze
the determinants of such policies. Gali and Perotti (2003) and Aghion and Marinescu (2008),
for example, nd that budget decits have become increasingly counter-cyclical in most OECD
countries during the past twenty years, but that the trend was weaker in EMU (European Mone-
tary Union) countries. Lane (2003) and Aghion and Marinescu (2008) analyze the determinants
of counter-cyclical policies. They nd that trade openness, output volatility, political power
dispersion, the degree of nancial development and in
ation targeting can play a role.
Another related branch of the literature is concerned with the symmetry or asymmetry
of scal policies over the business cycle. Gavin and Perotti (1997), for example, show for
Latin America that government spending is moderately procyclical in expansions but strongly
countercyclical in recessions. Sorensen and Yosha (2001) nd that scal policy is asymmetric
and procyclical in U.S. states and local governments. Our paper is particularly closely related to
Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004), Balassone and Zotteri (2008) and Leigh and Stehn (2009).
Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004) nd that asymmetric spending contributed to an increase in
the spending-output ratio in OECD countries during 1975-1998. More recently, Balassone and
3Zotteri (2008) nd similar evidence for scal policy in EU countries during 1970-2004, with scal
balances deteriorating in recessions but not improving correspondingly in expansions. Leigh and
Stehn (2009) analyze the asymmetry of monetary and scal policy in the G7 economies. Our
contribution to this literature is to explicitly model asymmetric preferences of the government
and to quantify the resulting bias in the decit.
Finally, the paper is related to political economy theories of public nance, where a decit
bias in scal policy can arise due to a fragmentation of political power or an expected change
in government. For example, political groups that share a common budget have an incentive to
engage in pork barrel spending that favors their constituencies (Weingast et al., 1981; Tornell
and Lane, 1999; Velasco, 2000). Also, governments can have an incentive to over-spend in order
to constrain spending of future, ideologically dierent governments (Persson and Svensson, 1989;
Roubini and Sachs, 1989a,b; Alesina and Tabellini, 1990). As a result, spending gives rise to
decits that are ineciently high. We contribute to this strand of the literature by exploring
the link between political economy issues and the precautionary bias.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical model.
Section 3 describes the empirical implementation and our data set. Section 4 presents the results
and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Model
In this section we develop a simple model to illustrate how a decit bias may arise when the
scal authority weighs negative deviations of output from some target level more heavily in the
loss function than positive deviations.
We label the deviation of output from the target level the output gap and denote it by yt.
We assume that yt is driven by a stochastic shock, ut, which is i:i:d: over time. Fiscal policy can
counteract the impact of the shock by adjusting the decit, dt, appropriately. More specically,
we assume that yt = dt+ut, where  is the scal multiplier. To model asymmetric stabilization













2This loss functions is also used in Ruge-Murcia (2003) and Surico (2008) who study the consequences of
asymmetric preferences for the in
ation bias of monetary policy.
4where d is the level of the decit that is targeted by the government. The parameter  > 0
is the weight associated with output stabilization and 
 governs the asymmetry in the reaction
to positive and negative output gaps. Note that if 
 < 0, then the scal policymaker weighs
negative output gaps more heavily than positive ones. In contrast, for 
 > 0 positive output
gaps receive a higher weight. In addition, it can be shown that for 
 ! 0, equation (1) reduces
to a loss function that is quadratic in yt and in dt   d (see Ruge-Murcia, 2003).
We assume that the scal authority decides on the decit before all the information in
period t is revealed, in particular before ut is realized. Therefore, the scal authority bases its
decision on information available in t 1. Thus, the government minimizes Et 1(Lt) subject to









=  (dt   d): (2)
This expression will be the basis for our empirical analysis.
To illustrate the implications of (2) for the average decit, we assume that ut is normally
distributed. It follows that the output gap is also normally distributed and exp(
yt) follows
a distribution with mean exp(
22)=2, where 2 is the variance of the output gap. Taking
unconditional expectations of (2), rearranging and taking logs gives:





Thus, we see that - on average - the actual decit, dt, diers from the targeted decit, d,
if 
 6= 0. More specically, if 
 < 0, the average actual decit is above the target level.
Intuitively, the decit bias is the result of a precautionary motive. This precautionary motive
arises since the government is more concerned about economic downturns than about upturns in
economic activity. Consequently, the government acts in a way that minimizes the probability of
a recession. Even if negative realizations of the shock do not occur frequently, the scal authority
may still run a decit on average, if this precautionary motive is strong enough. Therefore, we
refer to the term  (
2)=2 as the precautionary bias. Note that the accumulated stock of
government debt grows over time, if the precautionary bias is positive.
Although the decit deviates on average from the targeted level, it is not clear whether the
decit bias is inecient or not. Since the welfare losses associated with recessions may outweigh
the welfare gains during booms, social preferences may also be asymmetric with respect to the
business cycle. To the extent that the loss function of the scal authority postulated in (1)
5captures these social preferences, the resulting decit bias may be socially optimal despite its
implications for the accumulation of debt.3 In short, the decit bias would be a by-product of
a welfare maximizing scal stabilization policy.
However, it is also possible that the government's loss-function does not fully mirror social
preferences. For instance, suppose the electorate is myopic. In this case, we could expect scal
policy to be more precautionary in election years, when the government aims at increasing the
probability of re-election and therefore tries to avoid a potential recession. In our empirical anal-
ysis, we will try to shed some light on this issue by exploring the link between the precautionary
bias and political economy aspects of scal policy.
3 Empirical Specication and Data
To empirically estimate the degree of asymmetry of the loss function and to quantify the decit






t) =  (dt   df); (4)
where the exponential term is approximated by a Taylor series expansion. Rearranging terms
gives
dt = a + bEt 1(yt) + cEt 1(y2
t); (5)
where a = df, b =   and c =  
=2. Note that asymmetric scal policy implies that
b < 0. That is, a positive output gap results in a declining decit and vice versa. Based on the
reduced-form coecients we can also nd the structural coecient governing the asymmetry in
the loss function as 
 = 2c=b. Recall that 
 < 0 induces the government to conduct stabilization
policy in a precautionary way. Hence, if scal policy is counter-cyclical, that is b < 0, then if
c > 0 the reduced-form coecients indicate that negative output gaps are weighted more heavily
than positive output gaps in the loss function, which gives rise to a positive precautionary bias
in the decit. Note also that based on c we can infer the size of the precautionary bias.
Equation (5) is essentially a scal policy reaction function and nests several specications
estimated in the literature. For c = 0 we essentially obtain the specication used in Alesina
and Tabellini (2008). Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004) and also Balassone and Zotteri (2008)
3This argument ignores adverse consequences of high government debt in the future as this aspect is not
covered in our model.
6allow for an asymmetric response to positive and negative output gaps. This type of asymmetry
is also nested in (5), since the marginal eect of the output gap on the decit depends on the
level of the output gap and therefore also on the sign of the output gap.
Note that (5) contains the conditional expectations Et 1(yt) and Et 1(y2
t), which are not
directly observable. To deal with this issue, we use lagged observations of yt and y2
t 1 as proxies
for the expectation terms. That is, we replace Et 1(yt) with yt 1 and Et t(y2
t) with y2
t 1.4 Thus,
we estimate the following modied equation (5) using a panel data set:
dit = ai + byit 1 + cy2
it 1 + dXit + it; (6)
where we add Xit, which is a vector of additional control variables, and allow for country-xed
eects. The vector Xit includes a time trend and lagged total government debt as a percentage
of GDP to capture a debt stabilization motive (see Bohn, 1998; Gali and Perotti, 2003; Alesina
and Tabellini, 2008).
We also estimate specications where we add political economy variables as a number of
studies point out that political variables like the structure of government can be important
determinants of scal policy. More specically, we include several proxies for government frag-
mentation, election years and the degree of federalism.5
The degree of proportionality in the electoral system can have an important eect on the
decit, as greater representation of individual voters in the legislature potentially weakens scal
discipline (Aghion et al., 2004). Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004) conrm this hypothesis
with empirical evidence for majoritarian systems to be associated with greater scal discipline
than proportional systems. To control for this eect, we use an indicator variable for plurality
(pluralty) in our estimations, which takes on the value unity if legislators are elected using a
winner-take-all, that is, majoritarian rule and zero otherwise. In accordance with the literature,
we expect the coecient on pluralty to be negative: majoritarian systems are less representative
and are thus expected to encourage scal discipline and decrease the budget decit.
4Alternatively, we replace the expectation terms by the (squared) tted values obtained from a regression of
yt on yt 1, similar to the instrumental variable strategy in Gali and Perotti (2003) and Alesina and Tabellini
(2008). Our results are robust with respect to this modication.
5For additional robustness analysis, we also include the lagged decit in Xit to capture potential autocorrelation
and nd that although the eect and signicance of the squared output gap becomes weaker, our main conclusions
are robust. Further, we also test for cross-sectional stability and nd that our results are not driven by single
countries. Estimation details are available upon request.
7Proportionality in elections can also lead to higher decits because it may increase the
number of parties in government (Persson et al., 2005) and, according to Weingast et al. (1981)
and Velasco (2000), more fragmented governments run higher decits as a greater number of
constituencies compete for public funds while only taking part of the tax cost of these funds into
account. Roubini and Sachs (1989a,b) provide early empirical evidence for more fragmented
government coalitions to run larger budget decits (see Alesina et al., 1999; Besley and Case,
2003, for cross-section evidence for Latin American countries and for the U.S. respectively). In
our estimation, we use a variable for government fractionalization (govfrac), which is equal to
the probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government parties will
be of dierent parties. We also use the margin of government majority (maj), which is equal
to the fraction of seats held by the government, divided by the number of total (government
plus opposition plus non-aligned) seats and the vote share of all government parties (numvote).
According to the theory, we would expect a positive coecient for government fractionalization
and negative coecients for the vote share and the majority of government.
According to Franzese (2000), ethnic- and agrarian-party constituencies tend to be geograph-
ically concentrated, so multiple-constituency problems should be more evident when such parties
share in government. We use a variable that indicates whether the largest government party rep-
resents rural interests (govrural) and expect a positive coecient, if this increases government
fractionalization and thus induces an incentive to overspend.
The electoral budget cycle literature (see Nordhaus, 1975; Tufte, 1978; Alesina, 1995) states
that governments follow expansionary policies in election years in order to get re-elected. Con-
sistent with this literature, Alesina et al. (1993) nd evidence for electoral budget cycles in
OECD countries. Following the literature, we use an indicator variable that equals 1, if there
was a legislative election in that year and 0 otherwise. A positive coecient of that variable
would conrm the theory.
Finally, we use two variables that are related to federalism and, possibly, the number of con-
stituencies. The rst variable (auton) indicates whether or not there are contiguous autonomous
regions (such as the Basque region in Spain and Montenegro in Yugoslavia). The second variable
(state) indicates whether or not there are state or province governments that are locally elected.
The sign of the coecients of both variables, however, is not clear, because on the one hand
the presence of autonomous regions or locally elected governments might increase the number
8of constituencies and, therefore, fragmentation, but on the other hand it might lower general
government debt, if local authorities are scally more prudent than central ones.
In addition to the political economy variables themselves, we also include interactions with
yit 1 and y2
it 1. Recall that according to (6) the size of the precautionary bias is closely related
to the extent to which the decit reacts to the squared output gap. Hence, interacting the
squared output gap with political economy variables allows us to relate the size of the decit
bias to political economy issues. This extension will help us to shed some light on whether
precautionary scal policy results in a decit that is inecient from a welfare point of view.
As discussed in the previous section, although the precautionary bias may give rise to a decit
which - on average - lies above the target level, it is not necessarily ineciently high, as it may
simply mirror asymmetric social preferences. However, if the asymmetric preferences of the
government deviate from the preferences of the population, the resulting bias may be socially
inecient. In particular, if the loss function of the government does not mirror the preferences of
the population, this may be the consequence of political economy issues. For instance, it appears
plausible that the eect of fragmentation on the decit varies over the cycle. If asymmetries exist
in the group-specic loss functions such that downturns are weighted more heavily than upturns,
this would enhance the decit-spending incentive inherent in existing theories of government
fragmentation and the budget decit. By interacting yit 1 and y2
it 1 with political economy
variables we are able to explore such issues empirically.
4 Results
To estimate the parameters of the scal policy reaction function, we use annual data from
1987 - 2005 for 20 OECD countries.6 As our empirical reaction function describes discretionary
scal policy, we use the primary decit and the cyclically adjusted primary decit as dependent
variables. The primary decit does not include interest payments on net debt and therefore
re
ects the discretionary response of scal policy. The cyclically adjusted (structural) primary
decit corresponds to discretionary scal policy even more closely, as it additionally separates out
the eects of automatic cyclical 
uctuations in revenues and expenditures. Both our measures of
the decit are obtained from the OECD.7 The output gap, yt, is calculated as the log deviation
6Our sample inlcudes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, the UK and the US.
7For a detailed description of data sources, see the Appendix.
9of real GDP from the Hodrick-Prescott trend, for which we use a smoothness parameter of 6.25
(see Alesina and Tabellini, 2008; Ravn and Uhlig, 2002).8 GDP data are obtained from the
OECD Economic Outlook database. The political economy variables are taken from Beck et al.
(2008). Throughout the paper, we report test statistics based on standard errors which are
robust to heteroskedasticity of unknown form.
Table 1 displays the estimation results for our baseline specication of the scal policy reac-
tion function (6). Columns (1a) and (1b) show the results for the primary decit as dependent
variable, and columns (2a) and (2b) show the results for the cyclically adjusted primary decit.
In columns (1a) and (2a) we present the results for a restricted version of (6), where we exclude
y2
t 1 from the estimating equation.
From column (1a) we see that the structural decit falls with an expected improvement in
the output gap, as yt 1 enters negatively and highly signicantly. Thus, we nd that scal
policy is counter-cyclical, which is line with other papers on the cyclical response of scal policy
such as Arreaza et al. (1998), Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004) and Lane (2003). There is no
apparent debt stabilization motive, whereas the time trend is signicant and negative. Column
(1b) displays the results when we include the squared output gap, which is the variable we
are most interested in. We see that the estimated coecient on y2
t 1 is positive and highly
signicant, while the other coecients remain roughly unchanged. That is, the volatility of the
output gap partly explains the variation in discretionary decits.
Note that since yt 1 enters with a negative sign and the coecient on y2
t 1 is positive, our
estimation results are in line with the hypothesis that scal policy can be described by an asym-
metric loss function where negative output gaps are weighted more heavily than positive ones.
Consequently, the government pursues stabilization policy in a precautionary way generating an
upward biased decit.
Columns (2a) and (2b) largely conrm these results. However, with the primary decit
cyclically adjusted, the output gap and the squared output gap exert weaker in
uences. This
result is as expected, as the automatic response of revenues to variations in the output gap is
now excluded. Still, the squared output gap and, with the exception of specication (2a), the
output gap remain signicant.
8Our results are robust with respect to dierent smoothing parameters.
10The coecient estimates allow us to quantify the precautionary bias that results from the
asymmetry in the loss function. According to specication (2b), which is our preferred speci-
cation, the decit bias amounts to 0:11 percent of GDP.9 Since we observe an average decit of
0.86 percent of GDP in our sample, we conclude that 13 percent of the average decit in our
sample can the attributed to asymmetric stabilization policy.
Next, we augment our estimating equation with political economy variables to test for po-
tential linkages between the decit bias and our political economy variables as discussed above.
Results are presented in Table 2. We test for the explanatory power of each political variable
separately, without (columns a) and with (columns b) interaction terms between the political
variable under consideration and yit 1 and y2
it 1.
Columns (1) and (2) show that, while the signs are as expected, the degrees of government
fragmentation and government majority do not aect the decit, nor the decit bias. The vote
share of government parties (column 3) reduces the decit, as expected, except when we include
interaction terms. The interaction terms involving the fragmentation variables in columns (1)-(3)
are insignicant, suggesting that fragmentation is not linked to the size of the precautionary bias.
In particular, we cannot conrm that a fragmented government leads to a higher precautionary
bias, as is the case with the conventional decit bias from the political economy literature.
Interestingly, a rural interest of the largest government party (column 4) signicantly in-
creases the decit once the interaction with the output gap and its square are included. Rural
interest reduces both the degree of counter-cyclicality and the in
uence of output gap volatility.
Thus, while rural lobbying results in higher decits in general, it diminishes the precautionary
motive to counteract downturns more strongly than upturns.
From column (5) we see that plurality in legislative elections reduces the decit, which is
consistent with a stronger scal accountability of majoritarian systems. Interestingly, we obtain
a positive and signicant coecient on the interaction term between the squared output gap and
plurality. Thus, plurality tends to increase the precautionary behavior of the government. This
suggests that fragmentation would generate an asymmetry in scal policy, for example because
9Recall that the bias equals the average deviation of the decit from the target level and is given by c
2, where

2 is the variance of the output gap. In our sample the variance of yt is 1.20, which translates into a precautionary
bias of c
2 = 0:11 percent of GDP.
11interest groups discount total costs of government spending more heavily in upturns than in
downturns.
Decits are greater in election years according to column (6), but the eect turns out to
be insignicant once the interaction terms are included. The interaction terms themselves are
insignicant as well. A larger number of autonomous regions (column 7) increases the decit,
which again conrms the fragmentation hypothesis. Furthermore, the eect is stronger the larger
the output gap, which renders scal policy pro-cyclical, while the interaction term involving the
squared output gap is insignicant.
Local governments (8) reduce the decit and they do so independently of the output gap,
which might suggest that local scal authorities are more accountable for their policies than
central ones. The interaction term of local governments with the squared output gap is also
insignicant.
Overall, the parameter estimates remain remarkably robust across specications when we
control for political economy variables. In particular, we nd that regardless of the political
variable included, scal policy remains counter-cyclical, and y2
t 1 enters positively and signi-
cantly at least at the ten percent level. We nd only limited support for the hypothesis that
the precautionary bias is related to political economy issues. Although our results indicate that
plurality tends to increase the precautionary bias, while rural interests of the government have a
dampening eect, most political economy variables do not appear to exert any in
uence on the
precautionary bias. Thus, we conclude that the precautionary spending motive has signicant
explanatory power on its own, and is not due to some specic political incentive structures.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we explore how precautionary scal stabilization policy due to asymmetric scal
preferences may give rise to a bias in the public decit, that is a decit that on average exceeds
the target level. In our empirical analysis, we nd that scal stabilization policy in the OECD is
indeed consistent with an asymmetric loss function. Although our results for plurality suggest
that the bias is systematically linked to the electoral system, overall we nd only little evidence
for the decit bias to be linked to political economy issues. In other words, we nd only limited
evidence for a deviation of the government's loss function from the constituency's. Therefore,
we cannot conclude that the bias is inecient from a social welfare point of view.
12According to the literature, starting with the run-up to the treaty of Maastricht in 1992
governments have opted more often to restrain scal policy via scal rules rather than use it as a
potential instrument for stabilization. As our panel primarily covers the post-Maastricht period,
it is perhaps not surprising that we nd a general independence of scal policy from political
institutions. Our results concerning the lack of a link between political economy aspects and the
decit bias may simply mirror the fact that scal policies have been required to pursue balanced
budgets as a primary goal.
We would like to point out that while we link precautionary scal policy to political economy
aspects in our empirical analysis, it would also be interesting to examine the potential relation
between political economy and scal policy over the business cycle from a theoretical point of
view. Such analysis might also allow to investigate welfare implications, and appears to be an
interesting topic for future research.
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19A Appendix: Data Sources and Variable Description
Variable Description Source
yt Hodrick-Prescott ltered log of real GDP OECD Economic Outlook 76,
own calculations
primdef general government primary OECD Economic Outlook 76,
decit Annex Table 29
cycprimdef cyclically adjusted general OECD Economic Outlook 76,
government primary decit Annex Table 28
debt general government gross OECD Economic Outlook 76,
nancial liabilities Annex Table 32
govfrac The probability that two deputies Beck et al. (2001)
picked at random from among the
government parties will be of dierent parties.
maj The number of government seats Beck et al. (2001)
divided by total (government plus opposition
plus non-aligned) seats.
numvote The total vote share of all government parties. Beck et al. (2001)
govrural 1 if the largest government party Beck et al. (2001)
represents rural interests, 0 if not.
pluralty 1 if a plural system is used where legislators Beck et al. (2001)
are elected using a winner-take-all rule, 0 if not.
legelec 1 if there was a legislative election Beck et al. (2001)
in this year, 0 if not.
auton The number of contiguous autonomous Beck et al. (2001)
or self-governing regions.
state 1 if state or province governments Beck et al. (2001)
are locally elected, 0 if not.
Note: Sample comprises 20 countries during 1987-2005 (371 observations).
20